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IMMIGRATION OBSTACLES AND THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT'S HARSH
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS
Lateef v. Holder, 683 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 2012)
Justin Boitnott
I.

INTRODUCTION

Lateef v. Holder addressed the nature of a Legal Permanent Resident's
(“LPR”) trips outside of the United States and at what point an LPR's actions are
such that the individual effectively abandons their LPR status. The plaintiff,
Humaira Khalid Lateef, was a Pakistani citizen who had acquired LPR status in
1991 but later married a Pakistani man who did not possess an entry visa.
Although Lateef made recurrent trips back to the United States, she began to
spend the majority of her time back in Pakistan along with her husband and her
newborn daughter. By February of 2011 the plaintiff's husband had obtained an
immigrant visa, and traveling under the assumption that her LPR status remained
valid, Lateef's family attempted entry into the United States. The family was
denied entry, however, due to Lateef’s alleged abandonment of LPR status and
was charged with attempted entry into the United States without valid
documentation.1 Furthermore, Lateef was charged with “misrepresenting a
material fact to enter the U.S,”2 and the husband was charged with “attempting to
enter the U.S. to work without certification from the Department of Labor.”3

1

In violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).

2

In violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).

3

In violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(5)(A).
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Humaira Lateef acquired her LPR status along with her siblings and
parents when her family moved to the United States in June 1991. She traveled
back to Pakistan in August of 1991 and remained there for two years in order to
complete her final classes of medical school. Upon completion of her medical
education, she returned to the United States with a valid reentry permit and
remained in the country for two years. In 1995, she married a Pakistani man and
began spending most of her time back in Pakistan. In March 1996, she traveled to
the U.S. to complete the first part of a two-part American medical licensing exam.
At this point, her husband applied for a U.S. entry visa, which the couple believed
would soon be granted. After completing part one of the exam, she returned to her
husband in Pakistan after spending five months apart from him.
Shortly thereafter, she became pregnant with her daughter and remained in
Pakistan for over a year under the advice of her physician who cautioned her not
to fly during her pregnancy. In August 1997, Lateef returned to the U.S. along
with her newborn daughter who was granted LPR status as “a child born during
[a] temporary visit abroad.”4 While in the U.S., Lateef retook the second part of
the medical exam after failing her first attempt. She also attempted to apply for
naturalization but withdrew her application after learning she had not remained in
the U.S. long enough for the requisite period. After six months, Lateef and her
daughter returned to Pakistan, but Lateef journeyed back to the U.S. after three
months in order to apply for medical residency positions. Her trip was cut short
because her daughter, who had remained in Pakistan, was having emotional issues
due to Lateef's absence. After only thirteen days of job searching in the United
States, Lateef returned to Pakistan. She remained there for over six months in
order to plan her brother's wedding, but returned to the U.S. in January 1999 to
take her naturalization exam. After twenty days in the U.S. she traveled back to
Pakistan and stayed there until October of 1999 when she returned to the U.S. in
hopes of receiving job interviews. After two weeks, she was forced to return yet
again to Pakistan over her husband's concern regarding their daughter's continuing
behavioral issues. There she remained for twelve months until her husband and
newborn son were finally granted immigration visas in November of 2000.

4

8 C.F.R. § 211.1(b)(1).
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Three months later, the entire family traveled to the United States. Lateef
had been gone from the U.S. for fifteen months, and realizing that her extended
absence had threatened her LPR status, she lied to the immigration officer, telling
him that she had been gone only seven months. Since her passport did not support
her story, the family was taken to secondary inspection, during which time Lateef
yet again changed her story. Immigration officials searched the family's luggage
and found the records, which correctly showed that Lateef had been absent from
the U.S. since November 1999. In total, Lateef had made seven trips between
Pakistan and the U.S. and had spent only thirty-five percent of her time in the
United States.
In June 2001, removal proceedings began against the family. The
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered the family's removal from the U.S. after
determining Lateef had abandoned her status as an LPR, which subsequently
nullified her husband and son's visas and her daughter's LPR status. Upon appeal,
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the IJ's order and the case
went to the Sixth Circuit Court, which remanded it back to the BIA. The BIA in
turn vacated its original decision and remanded the case back to the IJ. In 2008,
the IJ sustained the original order and on appeal, the case eventually worked its
way back up to the Sixth Circuit Court. A total of eleven years elapsed from the
moment of the family's attempted entry into the United States to the time the
Sixth Circuit ruled on their case.
III.
A.

RATIONALE
Majority Opinion

Both the majority and the dissent in the Sixth Circuit Court's decision
relied heavily on the circuit's case precedent. Only two prior published cases
within the Sixth Circuit had dealt with the issue of an LPR's extended absence.
Hana v. Gonzales5 ruled that a woman who made two lengthy trips back to Iraq as
an LPR had not abandoned her status, but Karimijanaki v. Holder6 ruled that a
5

400 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 2005).

6

579 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2009).
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woman who made lengthy trips to Iran had indeed abandoned her LPR status.
Only the facts specific to each case differentiated their outcome. The Sixth
Circuit judges looked to determine whether the BIA had made reversible error
when it determined that Lateef's LPR status had been abandoned. Under federal
immigration law, an LPR may only lose their status if they abandon their status or
remain outside of the U.S. for more than 180 days.7 An exception to the 180-day
rule is provided only if the event was caused by “reasons beyond the alien's
control and for which the alien was not responsible.”8 If an LPR loses their status,
the consequences may be severe for the entire family. Any immigration visas
obtained for family members by an LPR are revoked if that LPR loses their
status.9 Additionally, if an emancipated child becomes an LPR due to their
parent's LPR status but that parent loses their LPR status, the child immediately
loses their status as well.10 In effect, the judges’ consideration regarding Lateef’s
LPR status determined the future of the entire Lateef family.
The two judges in the majority determined that Lateef had indeed
abandoned her LPR status, particularly on her final stay in Pakistan, which lasted
fifteen months. This, they pointed out, was well over 180 days and did not occur
due to reasons beyond Lateef's control.
The court differentiated Lateef's case from that of the petitioner in Hana
who retained her LPR status despite leaving the United States and remaining in
Iraq for over two years. There, the long departure was due only to the petitioner's
forced coercion to return to her native country of Iraq by threats against her
family from Saddam Hussein's regime. The Sixth Circuit emphasized that not
only was such a lengthy departure due to reasons beyond the plaintiff's control,
but the plaintiff had transferred $10,000 to the United States and had made
numerous attempts to leave Iraq but was prevented from doing so. Once safely in
the United States, Hana believed that her visa would no longer expire, and so
made one final trip back to Iraq to care for her dying mother-in-law. It was at the
7

8 U.S.C.S. § (a)(13)(C)(i) & (ii).

8

22 C.F.R. § 42.22 (a)(3).

9

8 C.F.R. § 1205.1(a)(3)(i)(J).

10

Karimijanaki, 579 F.3d at 719.
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return from this three-month trip that immigration authorities denied Hana
reentry. The Sixth Circuit reversed that decision, however, and ruled that “[I]t is
clear that [Hana's] failure to put down roots in the [United States] was due almost
entirely to her desire to help her loved ones safely flee a brutal totalitarian regime
and to her obligation to assist in the care of her terminally ill mother-in-law.”11
The court also gave weight to her transfer of $10,000 as evidence that she
intended to permanently move to the United States.
In contrast, the Lateef court found only one similarity between petitioners
Hana and Lateef. Like Hana, Lateef believed that her family would immigrate
along with her within a short time. However, the court found that unlike Hana,
Lateef “made no attempt to comply with the law to maintain her LPR status,” she
lied to immigration agents, she lived in a country that was not suffering under a
brutal dictatorship, her daughter did not possess any medical problems, and
“Lateef did not transfer assets to the U.S. to facilitate her family's emigration to a
new life.”12 The majority concluded that Hana's trips were driven due to safety
concerns while Lateef's lengthy trips were driven by “convenience.” 13 Thus, the
IJ's decision was upheld, Lateef's LPR status was revoked, and the family was
sent back to Pakistan.
B.

Dissenting Opinion

In her lone dissent, Judge Stranch concluded Lateef's LPR status should
have been retained since her extended periods of absence from the country were
just as legitimate as those in Hana. Stranch suggested that the Hana court
developed four reasons that legitimized Hana's lengthy departure from the United
States: (1) she was led to believe that visas would be given to her family within a
short time, (2) she made every effort to comply with the law, (3) she only returned
to Iraq to protect her family and care for her dying mother-in-law, and (4) she
took multiple steps toward living permanently in America, including the transfer
of $10,000 of her assets.14 Comparing Lateef to Hana, Judge Stranch concluded
that Lateef met the four factors, and that compared to Karimijanaki, which had
11

Hana, 400 F.3d at 476.

12

Lateef, 683 F.3d at 282.

13

Id.

14

Id. at 284.
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upheld a denial of LPR status, Lateef's absences from the U.S. were legitimate.
First, Lateef believed that her family would receive travel visas very
shortly, and so she traveled to Pakistan in order to aid them, just as Hana traveled
back to Iraq for three months to aid her family's preparations. Judge Stranch
rejected the majority's adoption of Moin v. Ashcroft15 from the Firth Circuit and
urged adoption of the Sixth Circuit's own decision in Hana which permitted an
LPR to travel back to their family while waiting for visas. Indeed, the standard in
Moin was quite harsh: “We appreciate the predicament which confronts
immigrants who marry non-citizens abroad. Because temporary visas are often
unavailable and processing marital visas may take years, they must choose to live
apart or risk losing their permanent resident status.”16 Lateef returned to be with
her family under the assumption that their visas would soon be provided.
Second, Judge Stranch argued that the majority was wrong to read Hana
as requiring an LPR to obtain re-entry permits. She did not see this as a
“dispositive factor” and points to Lateef's other actions as evidence of her
willingness to settle permanently in the United States. As an example, she pointed
to the Lateef family's first effort in 1996 to obtain a temporary visa for the
husband. His request was denied for the sole reason that he was classified as an
“intending immigrant,” meaning that his wife's status and their future intention to
permanently settle in the U.S. disqualified him for a temporary visa. Judge
Stranch remarked,
“It is indisputably contradictory and, to my mind, a patent
unfairness to first deny admission on the basis that Lateef and her
husband intended to live in America and then, after they waited
patiently to receive the proper immigrant visas, deny admission
again on the basis that they lacked the intent to live in America
during that time.”17
Third, Judge Stranch found marked similarities between Lateef's concern
for her daughter's depression and the actions taken by Hana to return to Iraq and
15

Moin v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2003).

16

Id.

17

Lateef, 683 F.3d at 286.
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care for her dying mother-in-law. Lateef's daughter was going through severe
depression in the absence of her mother, a depression that was diagnosed by
physicians back in Pakistan. Judge Stranch disagreed with the majority's
assessment that the daughter had not physical illness. She concluded that Lateef's
daughter was in fact quite ill, and that it was only natural that Lateef feel
compelled to put aside her career plans and return to care for her daughter. She
argued that this was hardly a reason to believe that Lateef had purposefully
abandoned her LPR status simply because she returned to care for her daughter
who was exhibiting “significant emotional and physical issues.”18
Fourthly and finally, Lateef did make efforts to transition to life in the
United States, even though an actual transfer of wealth was not involved. Instead,
according to Judge Stranch, all of Lateef's numerous trips to the United States, her
completion of the medical licensing test, her application for residency, her
naturalization test, and her job interview all point to her desire to permanently
move to the U.S. Furthermore, both she and her husband spent a total of $6,000
on different certifications and fees. Judge Stranch concluded that, “It defies
reason to conclude that Lateef, along with her husband, would have undertaken
such onerous steps and expended so much time and money throughout the time
period in question if she had abandoned her intent to remain an LPR.”19
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Lateef case serves to demonstrate the two vastly differing
understandings within the Sixth Circuit of the complexities facing a family in the
process of immigration. The majority adopted a rigid interpretation of the law
which did not provide allowances for families in transition who are forced to be
apart for months or even years at a time. Conversely, Judge Stranch's dissent
concentrates on the practical problems associated with immigration. The case
never addresses the issue that had U.S. immigration authorities acted properly
upon the Lateef family's visa request in 1996, the subsequent years of waiting in
Pakistan would never have occurred and the LPR status would not have been
revoked. Also left unmentioned are common issues that would be expected to
18

Id. at 33.

19

Id. at 37.
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arise in families who are experiencing separation due to the immigration hassle.
No consideration is given to the stress placed upon children, such as
Lateef's daughter, whose psychological issues are not as apparent as physical
illness but are just as serious. The Lateef family struggled to balance the
importance of family unity while simultaneously beginning a new life and career
in the United States. However, their case is only used by the majority to narrow
LPR exemptions originally allowed in Hana, resulting in requirements that are
now even more difficult to overcome and which are indifferent to the practical
challenges facing an immigrating family.

